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Abstract
We study endogenous signaling by analyzing a team production problem
with endogenous timing. Each agent of the team is privately endowed with
some level of confidence about team productivity. Each of them must then
commit a level of effort in one of two periods. At the end of each period, each
agent observes his partner’s move in this period. Both agents are rewarded
by a team output determined by team productivity and total invested effort.
Each agent must personally incur the cost of effort that he invested. We
show a set of sufficient conditions under which an agent chooses to become a
leader or a follower depending on his confidence about reward from the team
in a stable equilibrium. This means that a player endogenously becomes a
signal sender or a signal receiver depending only on the cost-benefits from
becoming a sender or a receiver.
JEL Classification: C72, D82
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
The study of endogenous timing games has advanced our understanding of
many economic phenomena through explaining when an agent takes an ac-
tion. It has successfully covered many fields such as oligopoly, bargaining,
and investment decisions. Yet, one field has remained unexplored to date.
Leadership in teams is a typical phenomenon in which the choice of action
timing becomes a central issue. It has been widely recognized that leader-
ship is a key to understand teams. Nevertheless, no successful explanation
has been made about when leadership emerges and who takes leadership in
teams.
This paper investigates leadership in teams by analyzing the model of
team production with endogenous timing. Leadership emerges in a team if
one member moves voluntarily prior to others and causes favorable changes
in the effort choices of the other members. We show in this paper that
under a set of sufficient conditions, leadership emerges as an equilibrium of
the team production with endogenous timing.
The failure to address leadership in teams in economics is mainly due to
the lack of an appropriate model of the leadership mechanism. The focus of
the studies of endogenous timing games is on mechanisms by which players
are sorted to move at different points of time. By the types of mechanisms,
the existing studies of endogenous timing games are broadly classified into
two groups. The first group mainly adopts private information and time
preference as driving forces. This type of models explains sorting by the
degree to which players face trade-off between the cost of waiting by itself
and the benefit of learning the rival’s private information by waiting (or
signaling the player’s own private information by waiting). These models
have been applied to areas such as investment decisions (Hendricks and
Kovenock (1989), Chamley and Gale (1994), and Gul and Lundholm (1995)),
bargaining (Kambe (1999) and Abreu and Gul (2000)), and war of attrition
(Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)).
The second group explains the sorting of the timings of moves by the ad-
vantage or disadvantage of commitment that is determined by strategic rela-
tions such as strategic complementarity or substitution. This type of models
has been mainly applied to oligopolistic situations such as Cournot com-
petition and Bertrand competition (Gal-Or (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), Mailath (1993), Normann (1997), van-Damme and Hurkens (1999),
Normann (2002), van Damme and Hurkens (2004), Amir and Stepanova
(2006), and so on).
Emergence of leadership in teams cannot be fully explained by those
types of combinations of the forces. Either time preference or strategic com-
plementarity or substitution is not necessarily present in team production.
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Rather, team output and contribution cost do not usually depend on timing
of investing efforts. Then, the team production problem is free from time dis-
counting. Furthermore, as suggested by Holmstrom (1982), although there
are possibly many types of team production functions, the natural specifi-
cation of the function is the product of total efforts and the productivity
parameter. This function is the prototype of the team production func-
tion, as has appeared in many applications (e.g., Hermalin (1998)). Observe
that the function implies neither strategic complementarity nor substitu-
tion. Therefore, the above two existing groups are not sufficient to explain
the emergence of leadership in teams.
We adopt a new combination of driving forces in order to explain emer-
gence of leadership. The driving forces are multi-sided private information
and simple payoff externality. Multi-sided private information means that
every player has private information about team productivity. Simple payoff
externality is that a player’s payoff depends on the action choices of other
players, but a player’s optimal action does not depend on the action choices
by other players. The production function that is the product of total efforts
and the productivity parameter implies simple payoff externality.
The combination of multi-sided private information and simple payoff
externality makes leadership emerge in teams as follows. Every agent holds
his personal expectation about team productivity based on his private infor-
mation. The expectation pushes an agent to voluntarily move before others
do when he is more confident and it induces him to wait for action at a
later timing when he is less confident. When an agent becomes a leader
or a follower according to his private information, signaling from the leader
to the follower is realized. Then, the sender enjoys a benefit due to the
simple payoff externality from increased effort investment by the receiver.
The receiver benefits from learning the sender’s private information. The
expectation of this signaling is the cause that sorts some agents into leaders
and others into followers. We say that endogenous signaling is realized when
(i) an agent chooses to be a sender or a receiver solely by comparing the
benefit of sending a signal with the benefit of learning a signal; and (ii) a
sender-receiver relation is endogenously realized by these choices.
We formalize the situation above into a simple team production game.
There are two members and each agent is privately endowed with some level
of confidence about team productivity. Each member must then commit a
level of effort in one of two periods. At the end of each period, each agent
observes his partner’s move in this period. Both agents are rewarded by
a team output determined by team productivity and total invested effort.
Each agent must personally incur the cost of the effort that he invested.
In this model, leadership by confidence prevails when (i) an agent, who
holds an optimistic belief about the reward from his effort investment for
the team, moves voluntarily and commits a certain level of effort in the
first period; and (ii) the other agent, seeing the first mover’s action, is
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induced to invest levels of efforts in the second period higher than he would
invest if the first move action did not take place. We show a sufficient
condition under which leadership by confidence is supported as a stable
outcome of sequential equilibria in the team production game. The sufficient
condition consists of four assumptions on the environment. First, confidence
is independent across agents. Second, agents are symmetric. Third, the
increase in the conditional expectations of team productivity when an agent
learns his partner is more confident is smaller when the agent himself is
more confident than when he is less confident. Fourth, effort cost is subject
to strong convexity.
The intuition is as follows. In order for leadership by confidence to
emerge, two properties must hold: (i) when an agent is more confident
about team productivity, he prefers moving first and signaling his confidence
to moving second and learning his partner’s confidence; and (ii) when an
agent is less confident about team productivity, he is unwilling to mimic the
behavior he would take if he were more confident.
The essential part of (i) is the trade-off between signaling and learning.
If an agent chooses to move second, he can make a better decision about his
effort by learning his partner’s confidence about team productivity. If he
moves first, he must give up the value of this information; however, he can
enjoy the increase in his partner’s effort. When agents are symmetric (the
second assumption above), the size of one’s own effort adjustment in moving
second and the size of an increase in his partner’s effort become comparable.
When an agent is more confident about team productivity, the impact on
utility is smaller for the former factor by the third assumption. Therefore,
he prefers signaling to learning.
Property (ii) is a single crossing property about a choice between moving
first and moving second. When an agent is more confident about team
productivity, he expects a larger impact on team output from an increase
in his partner’s effort by the first assumption. He also expects a smaller
loss of value of information by the third and fourth assumptions, because
his expectation about team productivity is less influenced by his partner’s
information, and he foresees that effort adjustment in moving second is
relatively negligible. Therefore, an agent is more willing to move first when
he is more confident about team productivity.
1.2 The Literature
We model endogenous signaling under multi-sided private information as the
driving force for leadership in teams. We relate our model to the literature
of endogenous timing games in the light of signaling.
There are broadly two groups of studies of endogenous timing games, as
mentioned above. The studies in the first group are exactly the ones that
paid attention to private information and signaling in endogenous timing
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games. However, once we remove time discounting from the models, every
player prefers to be a receiver and never desires to be a sender. The mere
private information is not enough to explain endogenous timings of moves
in teams.
On the other hand, the studies in the second group simply extend static
games such as Cournot competition into dynamic complete information
games by allowing players to choose the timings of moves. Signaling has
no role to play in explaining endogenous timings of moves.
Some papers in the second group studied the endogenous timing mecha-
nism of strategic substitution in the presence of private information. Mailath
(1993) is the first attempt. He studied a Cournout market in which only one
firm has private information and has a choice of timing for move in one of two
periods while the other firms have no private information and must move in
the second period. He showed that the informed firm endogenously becomes
a Stackelberg leader in equilibrium. Normann (1997) and Normann (2002)
extended Mailath (1993) to a model in which all the firms have choices of
timing for move while keeping private information restricted to one firm.
Signaling takes place in equilibrium in these models. However, since only
one firm is privately informed, the potential leader is determined a priori
and strategic substitution continues to play a crucial role for endogenous
timings of moves.
There is one previous study that explores endogenous choice of timing
solely by signaling and without assuming time discounting or strategic re-
lations such as strategic substitution or complementarity. Kobayashi and
Suehiro (2005) studied the team production problem in which every player
has their own private information and every player can choose timings of
moves at their own discretion.1 This team production problem is precisely
the one that this paper investigates. They found three possible types of
leadership in teams: leadership by confidence, leadership by identity, and
leadership by identity with confidence. Leadership by confidence is the out-
come that we defined above. Leadership by identity means that a particular
player moves first irrespective of his private information. Leadership by
identity with confidence is a hybrid of the first two. They showed that if
private information is independent across players: (i) leadership by identity
always exists as a stable equilibrium; and (ii) no stable equilibria exist other
than the ones by the three types of leadership.
An equilibrium with a particular leader in leadership by identity may
emerge only depending on an outside context about the team beyond the
description of the game. In contrast, leadership by confidence is independent
1This is an extension of Hermalin (1998) to the case of endogenous choice of timing.
Hermalin (1998) studied a signaling game with specific rules: (i) one member exclusively
holds information about team productivity; (ii) the member must commit a level of effort
in the first period; and (iii) the other members choose their levels of efforts in the second
period after observing the choice by the leader.
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of an outside context. Therefore, unless there is a specific outside mechanism
at work to induce a particular member to become a leader, leadership by
confidence should naturally realize in the environment in which every player
chooses his timings of moves. Hence, leadership by confidence is the most
natural solution of the team game. Precisely the issue of under what con-
dition leadership by confidence emerges as a stable outcome has remained
unsolved. This paper explains the natural mode of leadership in teams as an
equilibrium of endogenous timing games by identifying a sufficient condition
for the emergence of leadership by confidence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe our team pro-
duction game in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the sufficient condition
for leadership by confidence and prove our main result. Section 4 explains
the role of each condition in realizing leadership by confidence. We conclude
in Section 5.
2 The Model
We study the team production game of Kobayashi and Suehiro (2005). A
team with two agents i = 1, 2 is engaged in production. Each agent i
invests an effort ei ∈ R+ with cost ci(ei). The output level x of the team
is determined by x = θ
∑
i ei, where θ is a productivity parameter. Agent i
receives a benefit vi(x) from the output x. When agent i invests ei and the
team output is x, his payoff is ui = vi(x)− ci(ei).
We assume agent i is risk neutral in x, that is, vi(x) = six for some
si > 0. We assume the cost function ci satisfies the following conditions.
A1 ci is differentiable and c
′
i(ei) > 0 for any ei > 0 with limei→0 c
′
i(ei) = 0
and limei→∞ c
′
i(ei) =∞.
A2 ci is twice-differentiable and c
′′
i (ei) > 0 for any ei > 0.
The cost is strictly increasing in ei and is subject to increasing marginal
cost.
The parameter θ is a realization of some random variable θ. Each agent
i receives private information about θ before production. According to the
information, he is in one of the two states of confidence about team produc-
tivity. He may be more confident or less confident. Agent i is called H-type
in the former case and L-type in the latter. Let p(ti, tj) denote a probability
for an event that agent i is ti-type and agent j is tj-type. Let E[θ|ti, tj ]
denote the conditional expectation of θ given the event. The expectation
by agent i of type ti is expressed by:
E[θ|ti] =
p(ti,H)∑
tj
p(ti, tj)
E[θ|ti,H] +
p(ti, L)∑
tj
p(ti, tj)
E[θ|ti, L].
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The interpretation that H-type is more confident than L-type is modeled
without loss of generality as:
E[θ|L,L] < E[θ|H,L], E[θ|L,H] < E[θ|H,H].
This implies:
E[θ|ti = H] > E[θ|ti = L].
Agents must choose levels of their efforts according to the following time
sequence. There are two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1, each agent i may
exert an effort level ei or may choose to do nothing (denoted as ∅). If he
implements his effort in period 1, then he cannot do anything in period 2.
On the other hand, if he chooses to do nothing in period 1, then he must
implement his effort in period 2.
In this sequence of moves, the two agents must move (taking some ei or
∅) independently and simultaneously in period 1. Each agent i immediately
observes the behavior that the other agent j has taken. Agent i can then
utilize this information for his choice in period 2 if he has chosen to do
nothing in period 1. If both agents have chosen to do nothing in period 1,
both must invest some level of effort independently and simultaneously in
period 2.
Agent i’s strategy σi is a profile (σ
1
i,ti
, σ2i,ti)ti=H,L of Bayesian strategies.
The part σ1i,ti prescribes his behavior in period 1 for ti-type and it takes a
value σ1i,ti = a
1
i in R+ ∪{∅}. The part σ
2
i,ti
prescribes his behavior in period
2 for ti-type and it assigns a value σ
2
i,ti
(a1j ) = a
2
i in R+ for each possible
value a1j of agent j’s choice from R+ ∪ {∅} in period 1.
A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is called leadership by confidence when σ
1
i,H ∈
R+ and σ
1
i,L = ∅ for i = 1, 2. In words, leadership by confidence means each
agent moves first if and only if he is more confident about team productivity.
3 A Sufficient Condition for Leadership by Confi-
dence to be a Stable Equilibrium
Let us develop a sufficient condition for leadership by confidence to be a
stable equilibrium. Consider the following assumptions.
A3 (Type independence): Let ρj ≡ Prob(tj = H) = p(H,H) + p(L,H).
Then, p(ti,H)P
tj
p(ti,tj)
= ρj for ti = L,H.
A4 (Payoff symmetry): si = sj ≡ s and ci(e) = cj(e) ≡ c(e) for all
e ∈ R+.
A5 (Informational symmetry): E[θ|H,L] = E[θ|L,H].
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A6 (Increasing convexity): ci is differentiable three times and c
′′′
i (ei) ≥
0 for any ei > 0.
A7 (Decreasing returns to good news):
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L] ≤ E[θ|L,H]− E[θ|L,L]
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H] ≤ E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L].
A3 means agent types are independently distributed. A4 means the payoff
functions are symmetric. A5 means the conditional expectations of team
productivity are symmetric with respect to the realization of types. In
other words, good news and bad news have the same informational contents
irrespective of who holds the news. A6 means the rate at which the marginal
effort cost increases is higher for higher levels of effort. A7 means the increase
in the conditional expectations of team productivity when an agent learns
his partner is more confident is smaller when the agent himself is more
confident than when he is less confident.
To state the stable outcome of leadership by confidence under these con-
ditions, let us develop formulae for players’ payoffs from a play in leadership
by confidence. Suppose leadership by confidence (σ1, σ2) prevails. Let µj,tj
be a belief of player j of type tj that agent i is H-type. Then, the expectation
of his own contribution to his payoff by investing ej is given by:
s
(
µj,tjE[θ|H, tj ] + (1− µj,tj )E[θ|L, tj ]
)
ej − c(ej).
Let e∗(tj , µj,tj ) be the maximizer of this expectation.
2 The first order con-
dition for the maximization problem is:
s
(
µj,tjE[θ|H, tj ] + (1− µj,tj )E[θ|L, tj ]
)
= c′(ej).
Assumptions A1 and A2 guarantee that the first order condition uniquely
determines the interior solution for the maximization problem.
Suppose agent i of type ti moves first with ei. In the equilibrium, he
expects that agent j of H-type moves first with σ1j,H and agent j of L-type
moves second. Suppose agent i believes the following: by observing ei, agent
j of L-type holds a belief µj,L and responds with the sequentially rational
choice e∗(L, µj,L). Then, under assumption A3, agent i’s expected payoff
from his first move is:
Ui(ti, ei, µj,L) = sE[θ|ti]ei − c(ei) + s
(
ρjE[θ|ti,H]σ
1
j,H
+ (1− ρj)E[θ|ti, L]e
∗(L, µj,L)
)
.
2Note that we write e∗ rather than e∗j because the maximizer depends on j only through
tj and µj,tj because of assumptions A4 and A5.
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The payoff Ui also depends on player j’s behavior σ
1
j,H and a parameter ρj ,
but we drop them from its domain because our analysis is valid irrespective
of their values.
Similarly, suppose agent i of type ti moves second. In the equilibrium,
he expects that agent j of H-type moves first with σ1j,H and he invests the
sequentially rational choice e∗(ti, 1) under the belief µi,ti = 1 after observing
this move. He also expects that agent j of L-type moves second and he
invests the sequentially rational choice e∗(ti, 0) under the belief µi,ti = 0
after observing this move while agent j responds with e∗(L, 0) under the
belief µj,L = 0 after observing that agent i moves second. Then, under
assumption A3, agent i’s expected payoff from moving second is:
Ui(ti, ∅, 0) = ρj
(
sE[θ|ti,H](e
∗(ti, 1) + σ
1
j,H)− c(e
∗(ti, 1))
)
+ (1− ρj)
(
sE[θ|ti, L](e
∗(ti, 0) + e
∗(L, 0))− c(e∗(ti, 0))
)
.
Here we do not explicitly write σ1j,H , ρj for the same reason as for Ui(ti, ei, µj,L).
Our candidate for stable outcome of leadership by confidence is the quasi-
Riley outcome defined as follows.
Definition. A pair of (σ11,H , σ
1
2,H) is the quasi-Riley outcome of leadership
by confidence if for i = 1, 2:
σ1i,H =arg max
ei∈R+
Ui(H, ei, 1)
subject to Ui(L, ∅, 0) ≥ Ui(L, ei, 1).
(1)
Note that although Ui depends on σ
1
j,H , whether σ
1
i,H satisfies (1) does not
depend on σ1j,H . Therefore, a value of σ
1
i,H that constitutes a quasi-Riley
outcome is determined independent of σ1j,H .
First, we will show that there uniquely exists the quasi-Riley outcome
in the described environment. Let:
Mi ≡ {ei ∈ R+|Ui(L, ∅, 0) ≤ Ui(L, ei, 1)}.
Consider the equation of ei:
Ui(L, ∅, 0) = Ui(L, ei, 1).
If Mi 6= ∅, then there exists solutions e
−
i , e
+
i (e
−
i ≤ e
+
i ) to this equation and
Mi = [e
−
i , e
+
i ], because Ui(L, ei, 1) is strictly concave in ei under assumption
A2. With such a e+i , the quasi-Riley outcome is characterized as follows.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions A1 through A5, there exists the unique
quasi-Riley outcome of leadership by confidence, (σˆ1i,H , σˆ
1
j,H). Namely, if
e∗(H, ρj) 6∈Mi, then σˆ
1
i,H = e
∗(H, ρj). If e
∗(H, ρj) ∈Mi, then σˆ
1
i,H = e
+
i .
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Proof. Suppose e∗(H, ρj) 6∈Mi. Then, e
∗(H, ρj) is the unique solution to:
max
ei∈R+\Mi
Ui(H, ei, 1).
This means e∗(H, ρj) constitutes the unique quasi-Riley outcome.
Suppose e∗(H, ρj) ∈ Mi. Then, either e
−
i or e
+
i constitutes the quasi-
Riley outcome, because Ui(H, ei, 1) is strictly concave in ei under assumption
A2. From the definition of e−i and e
+
i , we have:
Ui(L, e
+
i , 1)− Ui(L, e
−
i , 1) = 0.
This reduces to:(
sE[θ|L]e+i − c(e
+
i )
)
−
(
sE[θ|L]e−i − c(e
−
i )
)
= 0.
Then, we have:
(
sE[θ|H]e+i − c(e
+
i )
)
−
(
sE[θ|H]e−i − c(e
−
i )
)
≥ 0,
because E[θ|H] > E[θ|L]. This inequality implies:
Ui(H, e
+
i , 1) ≥ Ui(H, e
−
i , 1).
The equality holds for the case of e−i = e
+
i . Therefore, e
+
i constitutes the
unique quasi-Riley outcome.
The intuition is as follows. Let us consider the case e∗(H, ρj) ∈ Mi.
In the definition of the quasi-Riley outcome, the maximization of agent
i’s payoff is equivalent to the maximization of agent i’s own contribution,
because his partner j is assumed to move first with σ1j,H if he is H-type and
to move second with response e∗(L, 1) if he is L-type. Agent i is more willing
to invest higher effort for his own contribution when he is H-type than when
he is L-type. Therefore, when agent i of L-type is indifferent between e−i
and e+i , agent i of H-type strictly prefers e
+
i to e
−
i . This selects e
+
i as the
unique quasi-Riley outcome in this case.
Next, we will show that the quasi-Riley outcome is supported by a se-
quential equilibrium. We will prepare two basic lemmata that characterize
the strength of agents’ incentives to move first for the purpose of convinc-
ing partners that they are H-type. The first lemma shows that if an agent
is H-type, the benefit of moving first with the interim optimal action and
successfully signaling his type exceeds the value of information he will enjoy
in moving second.
Lemma 1. Assume A1 through A7. Then, Ui(H, e
∗(H, ρj), 1) > Ui(H, ∅, 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
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The intuition is as follows. The difference between the payoff from mov-
ing first and moving second is decomposed as follows:
Ui(H, e
∗(H, ρj), 1)− Ui(H, ∅, 0)
= (1− ρj)sE[θ|H,L](e
∗(L, 1)− e∗(L, 0))
−
[{
ρj
(
sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1)
)
+ (1− ρj)
(
sE[θ|H,L]e∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))
)}
−
{
s(ρjE[θ|H,H] + (1− ρj)E[θ|H,L])e
∗(H, ρj)− c(e
∗(H, ρj))
}]
.
The first term represents the benefit of signaling by moving first, that is,
the increased contribution by the partner. The second term is the value of
information by moving second. The benefit of signaling is linear in ρj and
vanishes at ρj = 1. The value of information is concave in ρj and vanishes
at ρj = 0 and ρj = 1. Therefore, if it is the case that the benefit of signaling
exceeds the value of information at ρj = 1− ǫ for small ǫ > 0, it is the case
for any ρj ∈ (0, 1).
Consider the case of ρj = 1− ǫ for small ǫ > 0. In this case, the benefit
of signaling is:
ǫsE[θ|H,L](e∗(L, 1)− e∗(L, 0)). (2)
On the other hand, the value of information is approximated by:
ǫ
(
sE[θ|H,L]e∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))
)
− ǫ
(
sE[θ|H,L]e∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1))
)
,
because e∗(H, ρj) ≈ e
∗(H, 1) for small ǫ > 0. The approximated form of the
value of information represents the improvement in payoff of choosing the
correct action e∗(H, 0) instead of the wrong action e∗(H, 1) for E[θ|H,L].
Consider the parallel formula for the improvement in payoff of choosing the
correct action e∗(H, 1) instead of the wrong action e∗(H, 0) for E[θ|H,H].
The following identity holds for the sum of the two improvements:
[(
sE[θ|H,L]e∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))
)
−
(
sE[θ|H,L]e∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1))
)]
+
[(
sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1))
)
−
(
sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))
)]
= s(E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L])(e∗(H, 1)− e∗(H, 0)).
Therefore, we know the value of information is bounded from above by:
ǫs(E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L])(e∗(H, 1)− e∗(H, 0)), (3)
that is, the increment of team productivity times the increase in own optimal
effort corresponding to the good news that the partner is H-type rather than
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L-type. This is smaller than the benefit of signaling for the following reasons.
The partner’s effort adjustment e∗(L, 1) − e∗(L, 0) in formula (2) is larger
than the agent’s own adjustment e∗(H, 1)− e∗(H, 0) in formula (3) because
of the increased convexity of effort cost (assumption A6) and the decreasing
returns to good news (assumption A7). The team productivity E[θ|H,L]
as the impact coefficient of the increase in partner’s effort in formula (2) is
larger than the increment in team productivity in formula (3) because of the
decreasing returns to good news (assumption A7).
The second lemma shows that the relative benefit of signaling by moving
first over the value of information by moving second is greater for H-type
than for L-type. In other words, the single crossing property holds for the
choice between moving first and moving second.
Lemma 2. Assume A1 through A7. Then, Ui(H, e, 1) − Ui(H, ∅, 0) ≥
Ui(L, e, 1)− Ui(L, ∅, 0) for any e ≥ e
∗(H, ρj).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Consider the payoff difference Ui(ti, e, 1) −
Ui(ti, ∅, 0). The difference can be decomposed into three parts: (i) the loss
of moving first with e instead of e∗(ti, ρj); (ii) the loss of moving first with
e∗(ti, ρj) irrespective of the partner’s type, that is, the loss from giving up
the value of information from moving second; and (iii) the benefit from the
change in partner’s effort choice from e∗(L, 0) to e∗(L, 1). The benefit of
(iii) is larger for H-type than L-type, because the expectation of θ as the
multiplier of partner’s effort is higher for H-type. The loss of (i) is smaller
for H-type than L-type because the interim optimal level e∗(ti, ρj) is higher
for H-type.
The loss of (ii) is rather complicated. Suppose hypothetically that player
i did not know his type and believed with probability δ he is H-type. Con-
sider the case in which assumption 7 holds with equality. In this case, when
δ increases slightly, the increase in expected team productivity given tj = L
is the same as the increase in expected team productivity given tj = H.
Call them the increase in expected team productivity simply. Then, using
the envelope theorem, the change in the value of information from moving
second is approximated by:
s × the increase in expected team productivity
× [ the expected value of player i’s effort in moving second
−the interim optimal effort level in moving first ].
Player i’s effort choice e∗(ti, ρj) is concave in ρj under assumption 6. This
implies the term in brackets is negative. Therefore, the value of information
is decreasing in δ, and the value of information is smaller for H-type than
L-type. In the case in which assumption 7 holds with strict inequality, H-
type requires a smaller effort adjustment to partner’s type in moving second.
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Therefore, the value of information is even smaller for H-type in this case
and the loss of (ii) is smaller for H-type than L-type.
Now we will establish our main result based on the prepared lemmata.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions A1 through A7, the unique quasi-Riley
outcome of leadership by confidence is supported by a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 1, the quasi-Riley outcome uniquely exists. Denote
it as (σˆ1i,H , σˆ
1
j,H). Consider the following strategy profile. For i = 1, 2:
σ1i,H = σˆ
1
i,H
σ1i,L = ∅
σ2i,ti(a
1
j ) =
{
e∗(ti, 1) if a
1
j = σˆ
1
j,H
e∗(ti, 0) otherwise
for ti = H,L.
Consider the belief system:
µi(a
1
j ) ≡ µi,ti(a
1
j ) =
{
1 if a1j = ej = σˆ
1
j,H
0 if a1j = ∅ or a
1
j = ej 6= σˆ
1
j,H
for ti = H,L.
The constructed belief system is consistent with the strategy profile, that
is, the beliefs µi(σˆ
1
j,H) = 1, µi(∅) = 0 along the equilibrium paths satisfy
Bayes rule.
Let us verify sequential rationality of the strategies. Consider the incen-
tive for L-type to mimic the behavior of H-type and to deviate to moving
first with σˆ1i,H . If σˆ
1
i,H 6∈ Mi, obviously L-type has no incentive to deviate.
If σˆ1i,H ∈ Mi, then σˆ
1
i,H = e
+
i by Proposition 1 and L-type is indifferent
between moving first with e+i and moving second. Consider the incentive
for L-type to deviate to moving first with ei 6= σˆ
1
i,H . By the construction
of the belief system, L-type must expect his partner of L-type to hold the
same belief µj(ei) = 0 as the one his partner will hold when he moves sec-
ond. Therefore, the expectation of his partner’s contribution to his payoff
remains the same when he deviates to the first move. On the other hand,
the expectation of his own contribution to his payoff is strictly greater when
he moves second than when he deviates to the first move, because he learns
his partner’s type and makes a better decision about his effort choice.
Consider the incentive for H-type to mimic the behavior of L-type and
to deviate to moving second. In the case of σˆ1i,H = e
∗(H, ρj), H-type does
not deviate to moving second by Lemma 1. In the case of σˆ1i,H = e
+
i , H-
type does not deviate to moving second either, because Lemma 2 and the
definition of e+i mean:
Ui(H, σˆ
1
i,H , 1)− Ui(H, ∅, 0) ≥ Ui(L, σˆ
1
i,H , 1)− Ui(L, ∅, 0) = 0.
Consider the incentive for H-type to deviate to moving first with ei 6= σˆ
1
i,H .
For the same argument made above for L-type, H-type prefers moving second
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to moving first with ei 6= σˆ
1
i,H . Because H-type was proved to prefer moving
first with σˆ1i,H to moving second, he has no incentive to deviate to moving
first with ei 6= σˆ
1
i,H .
The quasi-Riley outcome of leadership by confidence is not only an equi-
librium outcome, but a stable outcome.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions A1 through A7, the unique quasi-Riley
outcome of leadership by confidence is stable.
Proof. Consider the sequential equilibrium constructed in the proof of
Proposition 2. In order to see that the belief system µi of player i satis-
fies the Cho–Kreps criterion, let us examine an incentive for player j to
deviate from the equilibrium. Consider the case of e∗(H, ρi) 6∈Mj . Because
σˆ1j,H = e
∗(H, ρi) by Proposition 1, H-type never has an incentive to deviate
to ej 6= σˆ
1
j,H . If Mj = ∅, then L-type does not have an incentive to devi-
ate to moving first with ej 6= σˆ
1
j,H either. Hence, the Cho–Kreps criterion
puts no restriction on µi(ej) for any ej 6= σˆ
1
j,H . If Mj 6= ∅, then L-type is
willing to deviate to moving first with ej ∈ Mj for some µi ∈ [0, 1]. There-
fore, the Cho–Kreps criterion requires µi(ej) = 0 for ej ∈Mj . On the other
hand, the Cho–Kreps criterion puts no restriction on µi(ej) for any ej 6∈Mj .
Therefore, the constructed belief system satisfies the Cho–Kreps criterion.
Consider the case of e∗(H, ρi) ∈ Mj . Define e˜
−
j as a solution to the
equation of ej :
Uj(H, e
+
j , 1) = Uj(H, ej , 1).
The inequality:
Uj(H, e
−
j , 1) ≤ Uj(H, e
+
j , 1)
in the proof of Proposition 1 implies e−j ≤ e˜
−
j . For ej ∈ [e
−
j , e˜
−
j ), L-type is
willing to deviate to moving first with the ej for some µi ∈ [0, 1] while H-
type never has an incentive to deviate to the ej . Therefore, the Cho–Kreps
criterion requires µi(ej) = 0 for such ej . For ej ∈ [e˜
−
j , e
+
j ), both L-type and
H-type are willing to deviate to moving first with the ej for some µi ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the Cho–Kreps criterion puts no restriction on µi(ej) for such ej .
For ej 6∈ [e
−
j , e
+
j ], neither L-type nor H-type has an incentive to deviate to
the ej . Therefore, the Cho–Kreps criterion puts no restriction on µi(ej) for
such ej , and the constructed belief system satisfies the Cho–Kreps criterion.
4 Are the Assumptions Indispensable?
We showed that leadership by confidence is a stable equilibrium under the
set of assumptions A3 to A7. Are these assumptions indispensable for emer-
gence of leadership by confidence? The answer is no. However, leadership
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by confidence fails to emerge if any of the assumptions are violated severely.
We will show where leadership by confidence fails to emerge for each of the
assumptions when violated severely, and will explain the causes of the fail-
ure. The role of assumption A3 is explored in Kobayashi and Suehiro (2005),
and it is shown that the assumption is important for the emergence of lead-
ership in various patterns including leadership by confidence. Therefore, we
will examine the remaining assumptions from A4 to A7 below. We applied
these assumptions in various steps for establishment of the emergence of
leadership by confidence. The most basic step is to prove Lemma 1, for
which we employed all assumptions. We will show that Lemma 1 ceases to
hold without the assumptions.
Lemma 1 asserts that H-type has an incentive to move first if he is
believed to be H-type when he invests the interim optimal level of effort
e∗(H, ρj). After Lemma 1, we showed a decomposition of the difference
between the payoff from moving first and the payoff from moving second. If
we reproduce it for agent i of H-type without applying the assumptions of
symmetry, the decomposition can be written as follows:
Ui(H, e
∗
i (H, ρj), 1)− Ui(H, ∅, 0) = Si − Ii,
where e∗i (ti, µi,ti) satisfies the first order condition:
si
(
µi,tiE[θ|ti,H] + (1− µi,ti)E[θ|ti, L]
)
= c′i(ei), (4)
and:
Si = (1− ρj)siE[θ|H,L](e
∗
j (L, 1)− e
∗
j (L, 0)),
Ii =
{
ρj
(
siE[θ|H,H]e
∗
i (H, 1)− ci(e
∗
i (H, 1))
)
+(1− ρj)
(
siE[θ|H,L]e
∗
i (H, 0)− ci(e
∗
i (H, 0))
)}
−
{
si(ρjE[θ|H,H] + (1− ρj)E[θ|H,L])e
∗
i (H, ρj)− ci(e
∗
i (H, ρj))
}
.
Now we write e∗i rather than e
∗ to show explicitly that it depends not only
on (ti, µi,ti), but also on si, ci(·). The term Si represents the benefit of
signaling by moving first and the term Ii is the value of information by
moving second. Agent i of H-type has an incentive to move first when Si
dominates Ii, that is, Si ≥ Ii.
Now we examine assumption A4 with the rest of the assumptions in
place. Starting from the case of payoff symmetry, imagine we change sj or
cj(·) for agent j. This affects e
∗
j (L, 1) − e
∗
j (L, 0) in the benefit of signaling
only. The first order conditions that determine the effort levels e∗j (L, 1),
e∗j (L, 0) give:
sj
(
E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L]
)
= c′j(e
∗
j (L, 1))− c
′
j(e
∗
j (L, 0)). (5)
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This shows that the increase in partner’s effort e∗j (L, 1)−e
∗
j (L, 0) will vanish
if sj falls to zero or if the slope of cj(·) becomes steeper, that is, the slope
of c−1j (·) becomes flat. Therefore, Si approaches zero while Ii remains un-
changed. Therefore, the condition for the first move incentive is no longer
satisfied.
When agent i of H-type signals his type by moving first, the partner is
reluctant to increase his level of effort if the reward rate sj from the team
production is negligibly small or if the cost of increasing effort is extremely
high. If the partner will increase his level of effort negligibly, it is not
worthwhile for agent i to give up the value of information and signal his
type. The same argument applies when we change the role of agent i and
j and we change si or ci(·). Therefore, the equilibrium in leadership by
confidence requires that payoff symmetry is not violated severely.
Let us show the tightness of the payoff symmetry requirement by an
example. Consider the case of ρi = ρj =
1
2 , E[θ|L,L] = 2, E[θ|H,L] =
E[θ|L,H] = 3, E[θ|H,H] = 4, and ci(e) = cj(e) = e
2 in which all assump-
tions except assumption A4 with respect to si and sj are satisfied. Then,
the first move incentive Si ≥ Ii for agent i of H-type reduces to sj ≥
1
12si.
The first move incentive Sj ≥ Ij for agent j of H-type is sj ≤ 12si. The
parameters si and sj must be in the symmetric fan along the line si = sj .
Next, we examine assumption A5 with the rest of the assumptions in
place. Starting from the case of informational symmetry, imagine we change
E[θ|H,L]. Consider how the first move incentive for agent i of H-type will be
affected. The benefit of signaling Si will vanish as E[θ|H,L] falls to E[θ|L,L]
for the same reason as in the analysis of assumption A4. That is, equation (5)
indicates that when E[θ|H,L] − E[θ|L,L] falls to zero, e∗j (L, 1) − e
∗
j (L, 0)
also falls to zero. On the other hand, the value of information Ii increases
as E[θ|H,L] decreases because agent i of H-type needs to adjust his level
of effort downward more drastically when he learns his partner is L-type.
Formally, we have by the envelope theorem:
∂Ii
∂E[θ|H,L]
= si(1− ρj)
(
e∗i (H, 0)− e
∗
i (H, ρj)
)
< 0.
Therefore, the first move incentive is no longer satisfied when E[θ|H,L] is
close to E[θ|L,L] rather than equal to E[θ|L,H]. The same argument ap-
plies when we change the role of agents i and j and we change E[θ|L,H].
Therefore, the equilibrium in leadership by confidence requires that infor-
mational symmetry is not violated severely.
Let us examine the tightness of the informational symmetry requirement
by an example. Consider the case of ρi = ρj =
1
2 , si = sj = 1, and ci(e) =
cj(e) = e
2. Suppose E[θ|L,L] = 2, E[θ|H,L] = 3−ǫ, E[θ|L,H] = 3+ǫ, and
E[θ|H,H] = 4 for a parameter ǫ ∈ (−1, 1). Then, all assumptions except
assumption A5 are satisfied. The case of ǫ = 0 corresponds to informational
symmetry. The first move incentive Si ≥ Ii for agent i of H-type reduces
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to −1 < ǫ ≤ 23 . The first move incentive Sj ≥ Ij for agent j of H-type
is −23 ≤ ǫ < 1. The parameter ǫ must be in the interval [−
2
3 ,
2
3 ], which is
symmetric around zero, so that informational symmetry is required.
Next, we examine assumption A6 with the rest of the assumptions in
place. We claim there exists an effort cost function c(·) for which:
e∗(H, 0) < e∗(H, ρj) < e
∗(H, 1), (6)
e∗(L, 0) ≈ e∗(L, ρj) ≈ e
∗(L, 1), (7)
if we do not require the function c(·) to satisfy assumption 6. The inequality
(6) means an agent of H-type adjusts his level of effort according to his
expectation about his partner’s type. When the inequality (6) holds, we
have a positive value of information Ii > 0. The near-equality (7) means
an agent of L-type chooses almost the same level of effort irrespective of his
expectation about his partner’s type. When the near-equality (7) holds, the
benefit of signaling is almost zero, that is, Si ≈ 0. Therefore, the first move
incentive for agent i of H-type is no longer satisfied.
The near-equality (7) occurs for a cost function c(·), which is almost
linear below e∗(L, 1) and is very convex at e∗(L, 1). Without assumption
A6, this property may be compatible with the regular convexity property of
c(·), which guarantees inequality (6). An example of such a function is:
c(e) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ e < 1
e2 − 1 if e ≥ 1.
(8)
Consider the case of ρi = ρj =
1
2 , E[θ|L,L] = 1, E[θ|H,L] = E[θ|L,H] = 2,
and E[θ|H,H] = 3. Then:
e∗(H, 0) = 1, e∗(H, ρj) =
5
4
, e∗(H, 1) =
3
2
,
e∗(L, 0) = e∗(L, ρj) = e
∗(L, 1) = 1.
Note that this function c(·) does not satisfy assumptions A1 and A2. One
can smooth the function so as to satisfy these assumptions and continue to
have the inequality (6) and near-equality (7).3
Finally, we examine assumption A7 with the rest of the assumptions
in place. Assume E[θ|H,L] = E[θ|L,H] holds and these values fall to
3For example, consider an arbitrarily given a > 1 and a function c(e) = αeβ for
0 ≤ e < a. Then, connect this function to the function c(e) = e2 − 1 at a “smoothly.”
Namely, find a set of values for parameters α and β such that the two functions cross
at a, that is, αaβ = a2 − 1, and the two functions have the same slope at a, that is,
αβaβ−1 = 2a. These values are α = a
2
−1
a
2a2
a2−1
and β = 2a
2
a2−1
. The second derivative of
the connected function is discontinuous and decreasing when a approaches 1. Therefore,
assumption A6 is violated. This connected function approaches the cost function (8) when
a approaches 1.
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E[θ|L,L]. When E[θ|H,L] approaches E[θ|L,L], the analysis of assumption
A5 holds with respect to the first move incentive for agent i of H-type. That
is, the first move incentive is no longer satisfied. Therefore, the decreasing
returns to good news should not be violated severely for agent i. The same
is true for agent j.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied a team production game in which each member holds his personal
judgment about the team productivity and chooses a level of effort at a time
he prefers. We examined the emergence of leadership by confidence, and
derived a set of sufficient conditions for this leadership.
The mechanism of emergence of leadership by confidence is endogenous
signaling. A sender-receiver relation is not determined by the rule of the
game, but is rather an outcome of equilibrium play. The expectation of play
of this sort induces a player to choose to be a leader or a follower depending
only on the cost-benefits from becoming a sender or a receiver in teams with
multi-sided private information and simple payoff externality.
The endogenous signaling explains endogenous choice of timings of moves
in an environment without time discounting and without strategic substitu-
tion or complementarity. There are many possible applications for endoge-
nous choice of timings of moves.
On the other hand, the sufficient condition for leadership by confidence
to be a stable equilibrium also guarantees that leadership by identity is sta-
ble. We argued that leadership by confidence should naturally emerge unless
there is a specific outside mechanism at work to induce a particular mem-
ber to become a leader. It is a worthy challenge to identify theoretically
and empirically under what kinds of play environment leadership by confi-
dence prevails and under what other kinds of play environment leadership
by identity emerges.
[2008.7.7 880]
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. To prove Lemma
1, let us prepare the following lemma.
Lemma A. Assume A1, A2, A6, and A7. Let e∗i (ti, µi) satisfy the first
order condition (4). Then, e∗i (H, 1)− e
∗
i (H, 0) ≤ e
∗
i (L, 1)− e
∗
i (L, 0).
Proof. By differentiating the first order conditions (4), we have:
∂
∂µi
e∗i (H,µi) =
si(E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L])
c
′′
i (e
∗
i (H,µi))
∂
∂µi
e∗i (L, µi) =
si(E[θ|L,H]− E[θ|L,L])
c
′′
i (e
∗
i (L, µi))
.
Assumption A7 implies:
si(E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L]) ≤ si(E[θ|L,H]− E[θ|L,L]).
On the other hand, assumption A2 implies e∗i (H,µi) > e
∗
i (L, µi). Together
with assumption A6, this in turn implies c′′i (e
∗
i (H,µi)) ≥ c
′′
i (e
∗
i (L, µi)).
Therefore, we have ∂
∂µi
e∗i (H,µi) ≤
∂
∂µi
e∗i (L, µi) and we have:
e∗i (H, 1)− e
∗
i (H, 0) =
∫ 1
0
∂
∂µi
e∗i (H,µi)dµi
≤
∫ 1
0
∂
∂µi
e∗i (L, µi)dµi
= e∗i (L, 1)− e
∗
i (L, 0).
Proof of Lemma 1. Define:
∆(ρj) ≡ s
(
ρjE[θ|H,H] + (1− ρj)E[θ|H,L]
)
e∗(H, ρj)− c(e
∗(H, ρj))
+(1− ρj)sE[θ|H,L](e
∗(H, 1)− e∗(H, 0))
−
[
ρj{sE[θ|H,H]e
∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1))}
+(1− ρj){sE[θ|H,L]e
∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))}
]
.
Then, because of Lemma A, Ui(H, e
∗(H, ρj), 1) − Ui(H, ∅, 0) ≥ ∆(ρj) is
obtained for any ρj ∈ (0, 1) by replacing e
∗(H, 1) − e∗(H, 0) in the defi-
nition of ∆(ρj) with e
∗(L, 1) − e∗(L, 0). Therefore, our proof is complete
if we show ∆(ρj) > 0. Observe ∆(1) = 0 and ∆
′′(ρj) = s(E[θ|H,H] −
E[θ|H,L]) ∂
∂ρj
e∗(H, ρj) > 0. Examine:
∆′(1) = s
(
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|H,L]
)
(e∗(H, 1)− e∗(H, 0))
−
[
{sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1))} − {sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0))}
]
.
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Assumptions A5 and A7 imply:
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|H,L]
≤ E[θ|L,H]− E[θ|L,L]− E[θ|H,L]
= −E[θ|L,L] < 0.
Furthermore, sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 1)−c(e∗(H, 1)) > sE[θ|H,H]e∗(H, 0)−c(e∗(H, 0))
follows from the optimality of e∗(H, 1). Therefore, ∆′(1) < 0. From the
three facts combined, we conclude ∆(ρj) > 0 for any ρj ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Define:
Ai ≡
[(
sE[θ|ti = H]e− c(e)
)
−
(
sE[θ|ti = H]e
∗(H, ρj)− c(e
∗(H, ρj))
)]
−
[(
sE[θ|ti = L]e− c(e)
)
−
(
sE[θ|ti = L]e
∗(L, ρj)− c(e
∗(L, ρj))
)]
Bi ≡
(
sE[θ|ti = H]e
∗(H, ρj)− c(e
∗(H, ρj))
)
−
{
ρj(sE[θ|H,H]e
∗(H, 1)− c(e∗(H, 1)))
+(1− ρj)(sE[θ|H,L]e
∗(H, 0)− c(e∗(H, 0)))
}
Ci ≡
(
sE[θ|ti = L]e
∗(L, ρj)− c(e
∗(L, ρj))
)
−
{
ρj(sE[θ|L,H]e
∗(L, 1)− c(e∗(L, 1)))
+(1− ρj)(sE[θ|L,L]e
∗(L, 0)− c(e∗(L, 0)))
}
.
Then:[
Ui(H, e, 1)− Ui(H, ∅, 0)
]
−
[
Ui(L, e, 1)− Ui(L, ∅, 0)
]
= Ai + (Bi − Ci) + (1− ρj)s(E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L])(e
∗(L, 1)− e∗(L, 0)).
The last term is obviously positive. The first term can be rewritten as:
Ai = s(E[θ|ti = H]− E[θ|ti = L])(e− e
∗(H, ρj))
+
[(
sE[θ|ti = L]e
∗(L, ρj)− c(e
∗(L, ρj))
)
−
(
sE[θ|ti = L]e
∗(H, ρj)− c(e
∗(H, ρj))
)]
.
The first term is nonnegative for any e ≥ e∗(H, ρj). The second term is
positive by the optimality of e∗(L, ρj). Therefore, Ai > 0 for any e ≥
e∗(H, ρj), and the proof is complete if we show (Bi − Ci) is positive.
For δ ∈ [0, 1], define:
Di(δ) = ρj
(
sE[θ|δ,H]e∗(δ, 1)− c(e∗(δ, 1))
)
+ (1− ρj)
(
sE[θ|δ, L]e∗(δ, 0)− c(e∗(δ, 0))
)
−
[
s(ρjE[θ|δ,H] + (1− ρj)E[θ|δ, L])e
∗(δ, ρj)− c(e
∗(δ, ρj))
]
,
where we denote:
E[θ|δ,H] = δE[θ|H,H] + (1− δ)E[θ|L,H],
E[θ|δ, L] = δE[θ|H,L] + (1− δ)E[θ|L,L],
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and we define e∗(δ, µ) in a parallel way to the definition of e∗(t, µ) by using
E[θ|δ,H] and E[θ|δ, L]. Then, Bi − Ci = Di(0)−Di(1). Examine:
D′i(δ) = sρj
(
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H]
)
e∗(δ, 1) + s(1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L]
)
e∗(δ, 0)
−s
[
ρj
(
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H]
)
+ (1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L]
)]
e∗(δ, ρj).
Assumption A7 and e∗(δ, 0) < e∗(δ, ρj) imply:
(1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L]
)
e∗(δ, 0)− (1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,L]− E[θ|L,L]
)
e∗(δ, ρj)
≤ (1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H]
)
e∗(δ, 0)− (1− ρj)
(
E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H]
)
e∗(δ, ρj).
Therefore:
D′i(δ) ≤ s
[
ρje
∗(δ, 1) + (1− ρj)e
∗(δ, 0)− e∗(δ, ρj)
]
(E[θ|H,H]− E[θ|L,H]).
The first order conditions for e∗(δ, 1), e∗(δ, 0), and e∗(δ, ρj) are:
sE[θ|δ,H] = c′(e∗(δ, 1)),
sE[θ|δ, L] = c′(e∗(δ, 0)),
s
(
ρjE[θ|δ,H] + (1− ρj)E[θ|δ, L]
)
= c′(e∗(δ, ρj)).
From this system of equations follows:
ρjc
′(e∗(δ, 1)) + (1− ρj)c
′(e∗(δ, 0)) = c′(e∗(δ, ρj)). (9)
On the other hand, assumption A6 implies:
c′(ρje
∗(δ, 1) + (1− ρj)e
∗(δ, 0)) ≤ ρjc
′(e∗(δ, 1)) + (1− ρj)c
′(e∗(δ, 0)). (10)
Given (9) and (10), assumption A2 guarantees:
ρje
∗(δ, 1) + (1− ρj)e
∗(δ, 0) ≤ e∗(δ, ρj).
This establishes D′i(δ) ≤ 0. Therefore, Bi − Ci = Di(0) −Di(1) ≥ 0. This
completes the proof.
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